TheMaMe82
ESP32 Realtime Fluid Simulation
1:01
TheMaMe82
digital fluid (esp32s3, LCD, touch, accelerometer, dual core) #fluidsimulation #esp32 #programming
0:45
TheMaMe82
Burning esp32-s3 dev board
0:29
TheMaMe82
pushed ESP32-S3 beyond its limits: Fluid Simulation with interpolated density field rendering
0:34
TheMaMe82
ESP32-S3 Fluid Simulation (Eulerian)
1:07
TheMaMe82
ESP32-S3 PIC/FLIP Fluid Simulation
0:47
TheMaMe82
RSSI correlation of Google/Apple Exposure Notification
0:41
TheMaMe82
07 07 scoolio chat google
9:12
TheMaMe82
07 06 case study scoolio realtime monitoring appsflyer
10:39
TheMaMe82
07 xx case study insta
9:15
TheMaMe82
Behind the scenes: Spying back on Android Apps
38:08
TheMaMe82
Neue Luca Lücke: Fremde Schlüsselanhänger einchecken, Kontakdaten für Gesundheitsamt beliebig ändern
6:06
TheMaMe82
11 Luca Location Betreiber manipuliert QR code um an Nutzerdaten zu kommen
16:47
TheMaMe82
09/10 Unterscheidung "infizierter" und "nicht infizierter" Profile
14:40
TheMaMe82
08/10 Rekonstruktion Bewegungsprofile: Analyse der Kommunikation ("per device" Check-In / Check-Out)
26:33
TheMaMe82
10/10 Zusammenfassung / Ergebnis
4:01
TheMaMe82
07/10 Rekonstruktion Bewegungsprofile: Analyse der Kommunikation (vor Check-In)
22:26
TheMaMe82
06/10 Einordnung/Relevanz der vorgenommenen Betrachtung
25:49
TheMaMe82
05/10 App-basierte Check-In Varianten und erste Design-Probleme
19:14
TheMaMe82
04/10 Prozess: Guest Check-In
23:44
TheMaMe82
02/10 Relevante Grundlagen (Kryptographie)
25:33
TheMaMe82
03/10 Prozess: Guest Registration
12:34
TheMaMe82
01/10 Einleitung (Fragestellung)
7:06
TheMaMe82
Luca: checkin to multiple locations (no check-out), for connection errors on *trackable* polling EP
1:18
TheMaMe82
LucaApp - Android client TAN verification bypass (verified client-side)
1:30
TheMaMe82
Enrichment of HTTPS Interception data with data from Binary Instrumentation (German)
14:05
TheMaMe82
visualizing "apps-tracker-transmitted data" in a single view with Kibana and Vega
2:13
TheMaMe82
Realtime visualization of Android App traffic (which data gets exfiltrated to which 3rd party)
2:31
TheMaMe82
Frida QuickJS performance test with Pokemon GO (2)
0:14
TheMaMe82
Frida QuickJS performance test with Pokemon GO
0:29
TheMaMe82
PGO instrumentation and traffic interception
1:41
TheMaMe82
Intercepted HTTPS traffic enriched with application data from a mobile device and track trackers
2:42
TheMaMe82
Attribute traffic intercepted with mitmproxy to source process on Frida instrumented Android device
0:46
TheMaMe82
Test Kibana Dashboard for Frida hooks (TikTok startup, event generated on-the-fly)
4:06
TheMaMe82
Request Smuggling custom tool 2/3: While probes are issued, multiple POSTS occur in the web app
0:50
TheMaMe82
Request Smuggling custom tool 3/3: confirmation stage for possible vulnerabilities
1:37
TheMaMe82
Request Smuggling custom tool 1/3: Auto-intercept POST request, timeout probes (CL/TE TE/CL CL/CL)
1:57
TheMaMe82
PoC for unauthenticated LFI on DIR-615, Fw 7.19 (latest for Malaysia)
1:53
TheMaMe82
For discussion with other devs
2:21
TheMaMe82
Use nmap to detect and destroy O.MG cables in blue team controlled WiFi networks
1:30
TheMaMe82
BLExy: rework of BLuetooth LE (cloned Logitech MX Anywhere 2S)
0:57
TheMaMe82
BLExy - WebUI dev footage
2:47
TheMaMe82
BLExy work in progress demo
6:36
TheMaMe82
BLExy test, pushing intercepted BLE traffic to browser SPA via USB (rendered with Quasar)
1:05
TheMaMe82
BLExy development: Proxy BLE connection of a mouse, relay to browser and back (WebHID)
0:54
TheMaMe82
BLExy: Research on suitable UI
1:20
TheMaMe82
BLExy: Test of BLE proxy at 7.5ms connection interval
1:13
TheMaMe82
BLExy test 2
1:48
TheMaMe82
BLExy trst
3:07
TheMaMe82
Wireless remote shell with custom built USB cable on an air-gapped Windows box
1:29
TheMaMe82
PoC: Bypass of Logitech Unifying patch for CVE-2019-13055
2:08
TheMaMe82
LOGITacker update v0.1.3-beta, device emulation on latets receiver firmware
0:51
TheMaMe82
LOGITacker tutorial: Using from Android, discover, sniff and store devices
2:38
TheMaMe82
Extract link encryption key of Logitech wireless devices (vulnerabilitily stays unadressed)
1:17
TheMaMe82
Logitech SPOTLIGHT presentation clicker: wireless remote code execution 2
0:10
TheMaMe82
Logitech SPOTLIGHT: Wireless Remote Code Execution after one-time physicall access
1:25
TheMaMe82
Unifying remote shell deployed via keystroke injection vulnerability
1:38
TheMaMe82
CVE-2019-13052 LOGITacker: Demo live decryption of Unifying keyboard after sniffed pairing
1:50
TheMaMe82
LOGITacker: Bypassing latest keystroke injection protection of Logitech MX Anywhere 2S
1:29
TheMaMe82
LOGITacker - sniff pairing and inject keystrokes with scripting
2:57
TheMaMe82
Logitech: Running a backdoor shell communicating only through a Unifying dongle
2:01
TheMaMe82
Unifying PoC 3: dump AES keys and addresses from dongle in less than a second + live RF decryption
2:42
TheMaMe82
CVE-2019-13053: attack on Unifying - keystroke injection (fully patched, encrypted device)
1:44
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 A.L.O.A. test relative mouse move from 5 concurrent HIDScript jobs
2:20
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 A.L.O.A. - USB Mass storage from webclien desktop view
2:23
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 A.L.O.A. workflow demo
5:14
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 work-in-progress web client tests (desktop version)
5:37
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 streaming log events to browser via gRPC in high frequency
0:32
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 webfrontend tests HIDScript (mouse + keyboard)
6:06
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 Rework: Extend boilerplate code for gRPC web-client for dynamic USB gadget reconfiguration
2:01
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 rework spoiler (screencast from remote CLI test)
7:57
TheMaMe82
Demo of upcoming HIDScript language for P4wnP1 rework
1:48
TheMaMe82
P4wnP1 WiFi covert channel demo
3:29
TheMaMe82
Backdoor Windows lockscreen with P4wnP1
1:41
TheMaMe82
Stealing saved webpage credentials with P4wnP1
2:04
TheMaMe82
[tutorial] How to connect P4wnP1 to Internet
5:05
TheMaMe82
Crack open locked Windows machines - P4wnP1 LockPicker payload demo
1:03
TheMaMe82
Beyond BadUSB and BashBunny... P4wnP1 covert HID channel demo (enable captions for comments)
7:41